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IMPLIED CONSENT TO INTOXICATION
TESTS: A FLAWED CONCEPT
PENN LERBLANCE*
INTRODUCTION
First adopted in the 1950's in response to the critical problem
of the intoxicated driver,I implied-consent statutes2 currently are in
force in all fifty states.3 The central feature of these statutes, that a
* Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; B.A., Oklahoma City
University; J.D., University of Oklahoma School of Law.
I See, e.g., New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Motor Vehicle Problems, 3
N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 25, 176th N.Y. Leg., 11 (1953). See generally Cramton, The Problem of
the Drinking Driver, 54 A.B.A.J. 995 (1968); Little, Who is the Deadly Drinking Driver?,
59 J. CRIM. L. C. & P.S. 619 (1968); Comment, The Drinking Driver: An Approach to Solving
a Problem of Underestimated Severity, 14 VILL. L. REV. 97 (1968).
2 New York was the first state to adopt an implied-consent statute. See Ch. 854, [1953]
N.Y. Laws 1876 (current version at N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1978-
1979)); Weinstein, Statute Compelling Submission to a Chemical Test for Intoxication, 45 J.
CEIM. L. C. & P.S. 541, 541 (1955). The original statute provided in pertinent part:
Chemical tests. 1. Any person who operates a motor vehicle or motorcycle in
this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test of his breath,
blood, urine, or saliva for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his
blood provided that such test is administered at the direction of a police officer
having reasonable grounds to suspect such person of driving in an intoxicated
condition. If such person refuses to submit to such chemical test the test shall not
be given but the commissioner shall revoke his license or permit to drive and any
nonresident operating privilege.
Ch. 854, [1953] N.Y. Laws 1876. See generally R. DONIGAN, CHEMICAL TESTS AND THE LAw
ch. 16 (2d ed. 1966); 2 R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIvING CASES ch. 33 (3d ed. 1978 & Supp.
1978); WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 627 (13th ed. C. Torcia 1972); Hurnnvald & Zimring,
Whatever Happened to Implied Consent? A Sounding, 33 Mo. L. REV. 323 (1968); King &
Tipperman, The Offense of Driving While Intoxicated: The Development of Statutory and
Case Law in New York, 3 HoFSsmA L. REv. 541 (1975); Recent Legislation-Driving While
Intoxicated-Implied Consent Statute in Ohio, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 277 (1968); Com-
ment, Statutory DWI and Its Interpretation by Texas Courts, 17 Hous. L. REv. 1082 (1977);
Comment, Illinois' "Implied Consent" Legislation: Suspension of License upon Refusal to
Submit to Chemical Tests for Intoxication, 5 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 298 (1972).
3 ALA. CODE tit. 32, § 5-192 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.031 (1962); Amz. REy. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-691 (1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1045 (Supp. 1977); CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353 (West 1971
& Supp. 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-1202 (1973 & Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
14-227b (1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2740 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.261 (West 1975
& Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 688-306 (1975); HAw. REv. STAT. § 286-151 (1976 & Supp.
1979); IDAHO CODE § 49-352 (Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95-;,2, § 11-501.1 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1978); IND. CODE § 9-4-4.5-1 (1976 & Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321B.3 (West 1966
& Supp. 1978-1979); KAN. STAT. § 8-1001 (Supp. 1977); Ky. REv. STAT. § 186.565 (Supp. 1978);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:661 (West Supp. 1978); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312 (1964 &
Supp. 1978-1979); MD. TaANsP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1 (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 90, § 24 (West 1969 & Supp. 1978-1979); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 257.625c (1977); MINN.
39
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driver impliedly consents to submit to a chemical test for intoxica-
tion, is now a well-accepted part of American law.4 Indeed, a recent
challenge in the Supreme Court has been unsuccessful,5 leaving the
STAT. ANN. § 169.123 (West Supp.1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-5 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 577.020 (Vernon Spec. Pam. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 32-2142.1 (Supp. 1977); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 39-669.08 (1943); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.383 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262-
A:69-a (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2 (West Supp. 1978-1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-
22-2.6 (1953 & Supp. 1975); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 39-20-01 (1972); Onio REV. CODE
ANN. § 4511.19.1 (Page Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 751 (West Supp. 1978-1979);
OR. REV. STAT. § 487.805 (Supp. 1977-1978); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547 (Purdon 1977);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.1 (Supp. 1977); S.C. CODE § 56-5-2950 (1976); S.D. COMPmED LAWS
ANN. § 32-23-10 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1045 (Supp. 1978); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 67011-5 (Vernon 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, § 1202 (Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 18.2-268 (Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.308
(Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-1 (1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 343-305 (West Supp. 1978-
1979); Wyo.'STAT. ANN. § 31-6-102 (1977).
In the two decades of enforcement, implied-consent statutes have met with almost
unanimous judicial approval. E.g., Anderson v. Cozens, 60 Cal. App. 3d 130, 131 Cal. Rptr.
256 (1976); People v. Brown, 174 Colo. 573, 485 P.2d 500 (1971)(en banc), appeal dismissed
sub. nom. Brown v. Colorado, 404 U.S. 1007 (1972); People v. Farr, 63 Ill. 2d 209, 347 N.E.2d
146 (1976); Newman v. Stinson, 489 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. 1972); Wolney v. Secretary of State, 77
Mich. App. 61, 257 N.W.2d 754 (1977); Bean v. Strelecki, 101 N.J. Super. 310, 244 A.2d 316
(1968); City of Kettering v. Baker, 42 Ohio St. 2d 351, 328 N.E.2d 805 (1975); Heer v.
Department of Motor Veh., 252 Or. 455, 450 P.2d 533 (1969). Contra, Voyles v. Thorneycroft,
398 F. Supp. 706 (D. Ariz. 1975) (Arizona statute subsequently amended, ch. 183, § 1, 1976
Ariz. Session Laws); Slone v. Kentucky Dep't of Transp., 379 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Ky. 1974),
aff'd, 513 F.2d 1189 (6th Cir. 1975) (Kentucky statute amended in response to decision, Pub.
L. 1976, ch. 29, § 1).
Only two states have found implied-consent statutes unconstitutional. New York's stat-
ute was held to be violative of due process on the grounds that arrest was not a prerequisite
to a sobriety test and a hearing prior to revocation of the driver's license was not required.
Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 54, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116, 128 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1954);
see notes 25-31 and accompanying text infra. In response to Schutt, the statute was amended,
see ch. 320, § 1, [1954] N.Y. Laws 1009, and has since withstood constitutional challenge,
see Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. Montgomery County
1955); note 26 infra.
The Vermont Supreme Court held unconstitutional the statutory provision that a defen-
dant could forfeit his license for refusing to submit to a sobriety test only when he pleaded
not guilty to the charge of driving while under the influence of alcohol. Yet, no such penalty
was statutorily mandated when a defendant entered a guilty plea. Veilleux v. Springer, 131
Vt. 33, 39, 300 A.2d 620, 624 (1973). The court, however, held this provision to be severable
from the remainder of the statute and the offending provision was excised. Id. at 41, 300 A.2d
at 626. The statute was later amended, see no. 79, § 5, 1973 Vt. Acts, to delete this provision
and has since been held to be valid. State v. Brean, 385 A.2d 1085 (1978). See generally Note,
Vermont's Blood Alcohol Test: Illegal Search and Seizure?, 2 VT. L. REv. 93 (1977).
5 In Montrym v. Panora, 429 F. Supp. 393 (D. Mass. 1977), an arrested motorist who
had his license suspended for refusing to take a breathalyzer test pursuant to Massachusetts'
implied-consent law, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(f) (West Supp. 1978-1979),
brought a class action to challenge the statute's constitutionality. The plaintiff had not been
advised of the consequences of refusal and, although acquitted of the criminal charges against
IMPLIED CONSENT
concept of implied consent virtually unscathed. While most citizens
are acquainted with this statutory device permitting a driver to be
tested for intoxication, the precise theory and operation of the stat-
ute may not be fully appreciated. Thus, it seems appropriate to
consider the nature of implied consent. This Article begins with a
discussion of the chief features of the typical implied-consent stat-
ute and considers the concepts of consent and waiver in the context
of such statutes.' Through this focus, the implied-consent concept
and its impact on broader notions of justice may be analyzed. As a
result of this analysis it is suggested that implied consent is a flawed
concept. The statutory scheme is not premised on implication. That
which is termed consent is in practice express, not implied.' Addi-
tionally, that which the statutes refer to as consent appears to be
the result of coercion rather than voluntary agreement. The faulty
designation is not, however, the serious flaw. Rather, it represents
the use of a needless fiction and results in a distortion of the image
of law as justice which should be corrected.
IMPLIED CONSENT: FEATURES
Typically, implied-consent statutes provide that any operator
of a motor vehicle is deemed to have consented to "a chemical test
of his breath, blood, urine, or saliva for the purpose of determining
the alcoholic content .. .of his blood." 8 A police officer, having
him, his license had been automatically suspended for 90 days. 429 F. Supp. at 395. The
district court held that the state law violated due process since the statute provided for a post
facto hearing on whether license forfeiture was warranted. Id. at 400. The Supreme Court
vacated the district court judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light
of its decision in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977), in which the Court held that a statute
which provides for automatic license forfeiture prior to an administrative hearing adequately
protects a driver's due process rights. Panora v. Montrym, 98 S. Ct. 386 (1977).
On remand, the district court found Dixon to be distinguishable and again held the
statute unconstitutional. 438 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Mass. 1977). The Supreme Court subse-
quently vacated its earlier order and restored the appeal to its docket. 98 S. Ct. 1229, U.S.
appeal pending sub nom. Mackey v. Montrym, 47 U.S.L.W. 3036 (1978).
6 Outside the scope of this paper is the related issue of what constitutes "driving" or
"operating" a motor vehicle while intoxicated. See State v. Purcell, 336 A.2d 223 (1975); State
v. Howard, 193 Neb. 45, 225 N.W.2d 391 (1975); Gallagher v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 666,
139 S.E.2d 37 (1964). See generally 1 R. ERWIN, supra note 2, § 1.01; King & Tipperman,
supra note 2, at 590.
7 See note 36 and accompanying text infra.
8 N.Y. VFH. & TRa. LAW § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). Many of the statutes
enacted, see note 3 supra, were patterned after the U~nIOM VEmICLE CODE § 11-902, proposed
by the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances. 1 J. VARON, SEARCHES,
SEIZURES AND IMMUNrrms 467 n.4 (1961). The language of the California statute is typical and
provides:
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reasonable cause to believe that a person has been driving while
intoxicated, is statutorily authorized, after arresting the motorist,
to request that the motorist submit to a chemical test.' The motorist
does have a choice of submitting to a chemical test or refusing to
do so; none of the statutes compel an unwilling motorist to be
Any person who drives a motor vehicle upon a highway shall be deemed to have
given his consent to a chemical test of his blood, breath or urine for the purpose of
determining the alcoholic content of his blood if lawfully arrested for any offense
allegedly committed while the person was driving a motor vehicle under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor.
CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(a) (West 1971).
The vast majority of implied-consent statutes now establish a minimum 0.10% blood
alcohol content as an indication of intoxication. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.262(2)(c)
(West 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95-2, § 11-501 (c)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §24(1)(e) (West Supp. 1978-1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625a(1)(c)
(1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50-1(3) (West Supp. 1978-1979); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §
1195(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19B (Page 1973); 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(d)(3) (Purdon 1977); Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 3(a)
(Vernon 1977). But see Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-39(1)(c) (1972) (0.15%); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 41-6-44(b)(3) (Supp. 1977) (0.08%). See generally R. DONIGAN, supra note 2, ch. 3; 1 R.
ERwiN, supra note 2, § 14.02. Some statutes, however, allow the courts to determine unlawful
blood alcohol percentages for motorists. E.g., State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1972).
9 The majority of implied-consent statutes establish the formal arrest of a suspected
drunk driver as a prerequisite for the administration of a chemical test. See, e.g., CAL. VEH.
CODE § 13353(a) (West 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.261(1)(a) (West 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 95-1.2, § 11-501.1(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978-1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §
24(1)(f) (West Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625c(1)(a) (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:4-50.4(a) (West Supp. 1978-1979); N.Y. VEH. & TiAF. LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney Supp.
1978-1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1 (C) (Page Supp. 1977); Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 62011-5, § 1 (Vernon 1977). Accordingly, courts generally have held that only an
arrestee can be compelled to elect between submission to a sobriety test or license forfeiture.
See, e.g., Layland v. State, 535 P.2d 1043 (Alaska 1975); Roumbanis v. Superior Ct., 29 Cal.
App. 3d 542, 105 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1972); Gallagher v. Michigan Secretary of State, 59 Mich.
App. 269, 229 N.W.2d 410 (1975); June v. Tofany, 34 App. Div. 2d 732, 311 N.Y.S.2d 782
(4th Dep't 1970); State v. Cruz, 21 Utah 2d 406, 446 P.2d 307 (1968). Some states, however,
have held that a formal or lawful arrest is unnecessary before a driver may be asked to submit
to a chemical test by a police officer. See, e.g., Mercer v. State, 256 Ark. 814, 510 S.W.2d
539 (1974) (probable cause for arrest sufficient); State v. Mitchell, 245 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1971)
("clear indication" the test was necessary); State v. Gillespie, 100 N.J. Super. 71, 241 A.2d
239 (1968) (necessary to preserve evidence); Commonwealth v. Griffie, 21 Pa. Commw. Ct.
403, 346 A.2d 838 (1975) (physical restraint sufficient); State v. Byers, 224 S.E.2d 726 (1976)
(some actual or constructive restraint must be effected). If an unarrested driver voluntarily
consents to an intoxication test, some courts have held the results admissible in a subsequent
action. State v. Lynch, 274 A.2d 443 (Del. 1971); State v. Hummel, 363 N.E.2d 227 (Ind.
App. 1977); People v. Burdo, 56 Mich. App. 48, 223 N.W.2d 358 (1974); State v. Seager, 178
Neb. 51, 131 N.W.2d 676 (1964); People v. Bartlett, 82 Misc. 2d 152, 368 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Yates
County Ct. 1975). Failure to submit to a chemical test, however, may not result in license
revocation when the motorist is not under custodial arrest. Prigge v. Johns, 184 Neb. 103,
165 N.W.2d 559 (1969). See generally Note, Arrest Requirement for Admitting Blood Tests,
1971 DUKE L.J. 601.
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tested.'0 Many statutes, however, require that the officer inform the
motorist that refusal to submit to the test will result in a forfeiture
of his driver's license." For the motorist who submits to a test,'2 the
10 See note 22 and accompanying text infra. A number of tests are used to determine
blood alcohol content, although the breathalyzer is probably the most popular, as it is the
easiest to administer and involves the lowest level of bodily intrusion. In addition to the
breath test, some states also allow the chemical testing of an individual's blood, urine, saliva,
or "other bodily substance." For a comprehensive dissertation on the apparatus and proce-
dures involved in these chemical tests, see R. ERwIN, supra note 2, chs. 15-25. See gener-
ally R. DONIGAN, supra note 2; Harger, Some Practical Aspects of Chemical Tests for Intoxi-
cation, 5 J. CaMi. L. C. & P.S. 202 (1944); Muehlberger, Medicolegal Aspects of Alcohol
Intoxication, 35 MICH. ST. B.J. 36 (1956).
Under some statutes the driver is given the option of choosing the type of test to be
administered. See, e.g., CAL. V EH. CODE § 13353(a) (West 1971); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29,
§ 1312 (Supp. 1978-1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 751 (West Supp. 1978-1979); VA. CODE
§ 18.2-268(b) (Supp. 1978). Other states give the option to either the arresting officer,
see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2741 (1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321B.3 (West Supp. 1978-
1979); Ky. REv. STAT. § 186.565(1) (Supp. 1978); MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 32-2142.1(a)
(Supp. 1977); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 262-A:69-e (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10(a)
(1953 & Supp. 1977), or the law enforcement agency, see, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 32, § 5-192(2)
(1975); LA. REV. STAT. AN. § 32:661 (West Supp. 1978); OHIo Rav. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1(A)
(Page Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 343.305(1) (West Supp. 1978-1979). The arrestee is
often deemed to have impliedly consented only to the breath test. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 322.261(1)(a) (West 1975 & Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95-/2, § 11-501.1(a)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(f) (West 1969 & Supp.
1978-1978); Miss. CODE: ANN. § 63-11-5 (1972); OR. REV. STAT. § 487.805 (Supp. 1977-1978);
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 1 (Vernon 1977).
," See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 32, § 5-192(c) (1977); CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(b) (West 1971);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227b (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.261 (1)(d) (West 1975 & Supp.
1979); IowA CODE ANN. § 321B.7 (West Supp. 1978-1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, §
1312.2 (1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 256.625f (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.4 (West
Supp. 1978-1979); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1(D) (Page Supp. 1977); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 32-23-11 (1976); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-102(c) (1977). Several states require
more than a verbal warning by the arresting officer. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-
1202(3)(b) (1973 & Supp. 1976) (inform driver orally and by written statement in both Span-
ish and English); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95-12, § 11-501.1(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (oral and
written advice in Spanish and English); LA. REV.'STAT. ANN. § 32:661C (West Supp. 1978)
(defendant must sign a standard form); N.C. GEN. STAT. 20-16.2(a) (1978) (defendant must
be informed verbally and in writing and furnished a signed document); OHIO Rav. CODE ANN.
§ 4511-19.1(C) (Page Supp. 1977) (written form must be read to defendant and signed by
officer and witness); cf. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 39-20-05 (Supp. 1977) (warning not an issue
at subsequent hearing).
Some statutes, however, do not require an officer to advise the motorist of the conse-
quences of a refusal to submit. See IND. CODE § 9-4-4.5-4(c) (1976 & Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT.
§ 8-1001(c) (Supp. 1977); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 32-2142.1(c) (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 59-1051 (Supp. 1978); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 2 (Vernon 1977).
A statute's failure to require the arresting officer to warn a driver that refusal to submit
to a test mandates license revocation does not necessarily invalidate the law. See, e.g.,
Hazlett v. Motor Veh. Dep't, 195 Kan. 439, 407 P.2d 551 (1965); Anderson v. MacDuff, 208
Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. Montgomery County 1955).
,1 For a discussion of the proper procedures for conducting chemical tests, see 2 R. ERWIN,
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results will be admissible in any subsequent criminal prosecution on
the issue of driving while intoxicated.13
The motorist who refuses to submit to a test forfeits his license
to operate a motor vehicle in that state for a time designated by
statute. 4 Frequently, the statutes provide that the immediate for-
supra note 2, ch. 27. Virginia is the only state which statutorily prescribes a chain of custody
to be followed when taking specimens from a motorist to determine blood alcohol content.
VA. CODE § 18.2-268(d)(1) (Supp. 1978).
0' See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.262(2) (West 1975 & Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 32-2142.2(b) (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.11 (1943); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
64-22-2.10A (1953); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1195(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979); 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(c) (Purdon 1977); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 § 3(a)
(Vernon 1977).
Some statutes, however, allow the results of a blood alcohol test to be used as evidence
in any civil or criminal action arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE tit. 32, § 5-193(a) (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.262(2) (West 1975 & Supp. 1979); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 95-1/2, § 11-501(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-2-22.
-2.10A (1953); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1195(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979); VA. CODE
§ 18.2-268(f) (Supp. 1978); cf. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Page Supp. 1973) (evidence
admissible only if test given within 2 hours of arrest); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.5 (Supp.
1977) (evidence admissible if test administered within 1 hour of arrest or else expert testimony
required to establish the test's probative value). But cf. Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-43 (1972)
(results not admissible in civil action). Two states restrict the admissiblity of test results to
the charge of driving while under the influence of alcohol. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227a(b)
(1977); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(e) (West Supp. 1978-1979) (admissible only
with driver's consent).
Although the results of a properly conducted test are strong evidence in any prosecution
in which intoxication is at issue, they are labeled by the statutes as presumptive or prima
facie evidence. The effect, therefore, is to raise a rebuttable presumption of drunkenness
which the judge or jury may weigh together with any other evidence. See generally 1 B. JONES,
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 3:79 (6th ed. S. Gard 1972); J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 235, 1707 (3d ed.
1940). The resulting increase in driving-while-intoxicated prosecutions is a success story
which some have criticized as being almost too successful. King & Tipperman, supra note 2,
at 542. Contra, R. DONIGAN, supra note 2, at 180. Of course, in those instances where intoxi-
cation is not indicated, prosecution can be quickly abandoned without the expense of a trial.
Thus, it is argued that both the state and the accused benefit from a system of chemical
testing for intoxication.
1' See note 11 supra. It is important to note that if a criminal trial involving the issue of
intoxication results in an acquittal, this determination does not necessarily prevent license
forfeiture. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 56-5-2950(h) (1976). But see Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-21
(1972); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 2 (Vernon 1977); cf. ALA. CODE tit. 32, § 5-
192(c) (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1045 (Supp. 1977); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 262-A:69-m
(1977); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1(I) (Page Supp. 1977).
Similarly, courts have found that license forfeiture is not precluded by a prior determina-
tion in a criminal action which was favorable to the defendant. In McDonnell v. Department
of Motor Vehicles, 45 Cal. App. 3d 653, 119 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1975), the defendant's license was
suspended for refusal to take a sobriety test. He was acquitted of the charge of driving while
under the influence of alcohol because he was unaware of the effect his drinking would have
when combined with the allergy medication he had taken. The court, however, held that the
defendant's guilt or innocence on the underlying charge was irrelevant with respect to the
suspension of his license. The Missouri courts have also followed this reasoning. In a case of
IMPLIED CONSENT
feiture of the driving privilege is only temporary, pending final de-
termination at an administrative hearing after formal notice. 5 Most
contentions raised at such hearings 6 have been found irrelevant and
unpersuasive, since the sole inquiry in most cases is whether the
motorist refused to submit to a sobriety test." Although the admin-
first impression in Missouri, State v. Byerly, 522 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. App. 1975), the court
unanimously held that acquittal of the underlying offense was of no consequence at an
administrative hearing on license revocation. See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 19 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 363, 338 A.2d 742 (1975); State v. Muzzy, 124 Vt. 222, 202 A.2d 267 (1964); Fritts
v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 6 Wash. App. 233, 492 P.2d 558 (1971).
15 See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(b) (West 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.261(e) (West
1975 & Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95-1/2, § 11-501.1(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(9) (West 1969 & Supp. 1978-1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.4(a)
(West Supp. 1978-1979); N.Y. VEH. & TRw. LAW § 1194(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1(D) (Page Supp. 1977); TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-
5, § 2 (Vernon 1977). :
"1 See text accompanying notes 70-71 infra.
11 The scope of the administrative hearings held concerning license forfeiture is generally
prescribed by statute and limited to whether there were reasonable grounds for the arrest, a
proper request by the officer that the driver submit to a chemical test, and a refusal to do so
by the defendant. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 24(9) (West 1969 & Supp. 1978-
1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.4(a) (West Supp. 1978-1979); Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
67011-5, § 2 (Vernon 1977). Some statutes allow review of a fourth issue: whether the defen-
dant was informed of the consequences of refusal. See, e.g., CAL. VEI. CODE § 13353(b) (West
1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.261(a) (West 1975 & Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95-12, §
11-501.1(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); cf. ALA. CODE tit. 32, § 5-192(d) (1975); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 1194(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
In determining whether there are reasonable grounds for arrest, several statutes provide
for a preliminary breath test. The officer may administer this test to the suspect and thereby
establish the propriety of arrest and subsequent chemical test. There is generally no penalty
for refusing to submit to such screening tests and the results of the preliminary tests are not
admissible in any subsequent proceedings. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.261(1)(b)(1) (West
1975 & Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.121(1)(d) (West Supp. 1978); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 63-11-5 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3 (1978); VA. CODE § 18.2-267 (Supp. 1978). But
see N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1193-a (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). See generally Smith,
Using the Alcohol Screening Test on Motor Vehicle Operators, 35 ALB. L. Rav. 455 (1971).
Although mere refusal to submit to a post-arrest chemical test generally is sufficient to
invoke the revocation penalties of the implied-consent laws, one statute mandates considera-
tion of whether the test was "medically inadvisable." COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-1202(3)(e)
(1973). Another statute requires scrutiny of the reasonableness of the refusal. NEB. Ray. STAT.
§ 39-669.16 (Supp. 1977).
Several jurisdictions hold the refusal to submit to be inadmissible in any resulting crimi-
nal proceeding. See e.g., COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-1202(3)(h) (1973); HAw. REv. STAT. §
286-159 (1976 & Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95- /2, § 11-501(h) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(e) (West 1969 & Supp. 1978-1979); VA. CODE § 18.2-
268(i) (Supp. 1978);cf. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2(b) (Supp. 1977) (evidence of refusal inadnmis-
sible unless defendant elects to testify). Some state courts have ruled evidence of refusal
inadmissible even though the statute is silent. See, e.g., State v. Anonymous, 6 Conn. Cir.
Ct. 470, 276 A.2d 452 (1971); State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 212 N.W.2d 863 (1973); Bailey
v. City of Tulsa, 491 P.2d 316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Boney v. State, 548 S.W.2d 730 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1977). But see Commonwealth v. Robinson, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 131, 324 A.2d 441
19781
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istrative determination to revoke a driver's license is subject to judi-
cial review, it is significant that the loss of the privilege to drive is
a civil, not criminal, sanction."8 The distinction between criminal
and administrative or civil sanctions has been the salvation of
implied-consent statutes from constitutional challenges.,9
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
In Schmerber v. California,20 the Supreme Court held that a
sobriety test, reasonably performed by competent personnel, may
be constitutionally administered without the suspect's consent."
(1974). Other states, however, allow evidence of refusal in any criminal or civil trial. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE tit. 32, § 5-192 (h) (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-691 (H) (1976); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 21, § 2749 (1974); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1194(4) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1205 (a) (Supp. 1978); cf. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 39-20-08 (1972)
(refusal admissible only if defendant testifies). See generally 1 J. VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES
AND IMMUNITIES 465-74 (1961); Cohen, The Case for Admitting Evidence of Refusal to Take a
Breath Test, 6 TEX. TECH. U. L. REv. 927 (1975); Herold, Refusal to Take a Drunk Driving
Test: A Prosecution Point of View, 24 BROOKLYN BARRISTER 151 (1973).
'" See note 19 infra.
,9 Since the "statute provides no criminal consequences from a refusal to take the test,"
some courts have reasoned that there is no self-incrimination issue. Bailey v. City of Tulsa,
491 P.2d 316, 318 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971). In Bailey, the defendant was involved in an
automobile accident after which the arresting officers advised him of his rights prior to his
consenting to a breath test. Bailey appealed from a conviction for driving while intoxicated
on the grounds that the implied-consent law forces an individual to give evidence against
himself. Id. at 317. In affirming the conviction, the appellate court conceded that such
nontestimonial evidence fell within the self-incrimination prohibition of the state's constitu-
tion, but that the driver was not under an unconstitutional compulsion to submit. Id. at 318-
19.
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
2 Id. at 772. Historically, administration of involuntary medical procedures has been
closely scrutinized by the Supreme Court. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the
Court reviewed a conviction for possession of narcotics based on evidence obtained by pump-
ing the defendant's stomach, without his consent. Applying the fourteenth amendment, the
Court held that state "convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend a 'sense
of justice.'" Id. at 173. The Court, therefore, reversed the conviction concluding that the
police had used "force so brutal and so offensive" that their actions violated the due process
clause. Id. at 174. Five years later, however, the Court held the extraction of a blood sample
from an unconscious suspect, for analysis by a physician, was not so "brutal" or "offensive"
as to violate due process. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). The Breithaupt Court
concluded "that a blood test taken by a skilled technician is not such 'conduct that shocks
the conscience,' . .. nor such a method of obtaining evidence that it offends a 'sense of jus-
tice'...." Id. at 437. The Schmerber Court, citing Breithaupt, found no due-process vio-
lation. 384 U.S. at 759-60. In rejecting the contention that the use of the test results violated
the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court held that "[slince the blood test evidence,
although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor
evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmis-
sible on privilege grounds." Id. at 765. Finally, the defendant's unreasonable search and
seizure argument was rejected by the Schmerber Court since the test was made incidental to
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Rather than applying Schmerber and compelling arrestees to sub-
mit to such tests, states have "deemed fit to grant suspected intoxi-
cated drivers more 'protection' than is constitutionally required. '22
In this way the driver may either consent to a sobriety test or forfeit
the privilege to drive.2 3 It is from this grant of greater protection that
significant issues, unresolved by Schmerber, arise.
New York was the first state to enact an implied-consent stat-
ute.' Its judiciary's response to constitutional challenges, therefore,
is useful in understanding the reasoning generally employed to de-
feat various constitutional objections. In Schutt v. MacDuff,2 New
York's statute prevailed over all challenges except for a two-fold due
process attack: the failure to require that officers effect a lawful
arrest prior to requesting a test, and the failure to provide for an
a lawful arrest. The Court found that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant for
driving while intoxicated, that there was insufficient time to seek out a magistrate and secure
a warrant because of alcohol's propensity to dissipate in the blood, and that a reasonable
means of seizing the evidence had been employed. Id. at 768-71.
" State v. Brean, 385 A.2d 1085, 1088 (1978). If sobriety tests can be constitutionally
compelled, why should a suspect be allowed to refuse to submit to a sobriety test? The answer
is the potential for physical coercion and the Rochin rule against brutal and offensive con-
duct. As one court reasoned: "[nt is simply because such a person has the physical power
to make the test impractical, and dangerous to himself and those charged with administering
it, that [testing] is excused upon an indication of his unwillingness." Bush v. Bright, 264
Cal. App. 2d 788, 780, 71 Cal. Rptr. 123, 125 (1968) (emphasis in original).
" It is also important to determine whether this protection includes a right to the pres-
ence of counsel at the time a sobriety test is offered. Prior to Schmerber, lower courts gener-
ally had concluded that there was no constitutional right to advice of counsel before deciding
whether to submit to a sobriety test. See, e.g., Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 181 N.E.2d
427, 226 N.Y.S.2d 403, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 912 (1962). The reasoning in Schmerber on the
right to counsel issue, however, takes on added significance in light of the right to refuse a
test contained in implied-consent statutes. According to Schmerber, since the defendant has
no constitutional right to refuse a properly requested chemical test, there is no issue of
counsel's ability to assist defendant. But do the implied-consent statues create a right to
counsel? See Note, Miranda's Applicability to the Breathalyzer and Blood Tests, 7 WArm
FOREST L. REV. 313 (1971). The answer to this question involves a number of considerations.
The first is whether the request to submit to a test is a stage of the criminal proceeding
whereby the absence of counsel would harm defendant's right to a fair trial; the second,
whether counsel could provide meaningful assistance at such a proceeding would have to be
considered; and finally, whether the state's interests outweigh defendant's rights. See Note,
Right to Counsel Under Oregon's Implied Consent Law, 10 WiLAMmrr L.J. 236 (1974);
Recent Cases-Right to Counsel Prior to Submission to Breathalyzer Test-The Impact of
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 3Z 98, 42 Mo. L. Rav. 168 (1977). Some statutes provide that
a suspect may confer with counsel before making a decision. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95-2, §
11-501.1(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a)(4) (1978); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 1202(b) (Supp. 1978). But see CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(a) (West 1971); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10(g) (Supp. 1977).
2 See note 1 supra.
" 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1954).
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administrative hearing prior to license revocation."6 The Schutt
court resolved the self-incrimination claim by quoting from the New
York Legislature's committee report: "'[T]he accused is given the
choice of waiving his right against self-incrimination-assuming
such a right exists-or losing the privilege to continue driving on our
highways."' 27 In addition to this conditioned-privilege answer, the
court reasoned that there was no right against self-incrimination
"because the decisions of this State have limited the effect of the
State constitutional provision against self-incrimination to protect
only as against testimony compulsion, that is, as to disclosures by
utterance, oral or written." ' The claim of unreasonable search and
seizure was rejected by the Schutt court because the motorist,
"being under legal arrest, could be searched for evidences of the
crime"29 and because the statute "is premised upon the consent of
the licensee to submit to the test when demanded.""0 Although not
expansive in its reasoning, the court's point is clear: by operating
the automobile the motorist has consented to a search for evidence
of intoxication through a chemical test if probable cause for a search
exists.3'
25 Id. at 52-53, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 126-27. In Schutt, the petitioner was arrested for driving
while intoxicated and was taken to the police station for booking. When requested by the
police to go to the hospital for a blood test he refused and his license was subsequently
revoked. Id. at 45, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 120. After being exonerated of the criminal charge of
driving while intoxicated, Schutt commenced judicial proceedings to annul the revocation of
his license and to challenge the constitutionality of the implied-consent statute. Id. at 46,
127 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
In 1954 the statute was amended to remedy the flaws pointed out in Schutt. Ch. 320, §
1, [1954] N.Y. Laws 1009 (amending ch. 854, § 1, [1953] N.Y. Laws 1876). It was antici-
pated that these changes would "[remove] constitutional questions which [had] been
raised concerning the statute." Governor's Memorandum (N.Y.S. 715, N.Y.A. 3389, 177th
Sess.), reprinted in [1954] N.Y. LEdIS. ANN. 391.
Shortly after its enactment, the amended statute was attacked in Anderson v. MacDuff,
208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. Montgomery County 1955). Anderson was acquit-
ted of a drunk driving charge prior to the revocation of his license. He challenged the law on
the ground that it failed to require a warning of the consequences of refusal. Id. at 273, 143
N.Y.S.2d at 258. The court upheld the statute finding that driving in the state is a privilege
and subject to qualification. Id., 143 N.Y.S.2d at 259. A warning requirement was later added
to the New York statute. See Ch. 85, § 1, [1968] N.Y. Laws 672 (amending ch. 963, § 1,
[19661 N.Y. Laws 3270). See generally King & Tipperman, supra note 2, at 549-56.
2 205 Misc. at 48, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 122 (quoting New York State Joint Legislative Com-
mittee on Motor Vehicle Problems, 3 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 25, 176th N.Y. Leg., 26 (1953)).
28 205 Misc. at 48-49, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
" Id. at 49, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 124.
Id. at 50, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 125.
21 On a less serious challenge, the court concluded that there was no denial of equal
protection because the licensed operator "stands in a class different from an unlicensed
operator of a vehicle and is subject to legislation specially applying to those persons in his
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The Schutt rationale subsequently has been cited in judicial
interpretations of implied-consent statutes in other jurisdictions.32
One court has reasoned the statute in question imposed "the condi-
tion upon the holding of a license. . . that the licensee voluntarily
consent to taking a sobriety test."33 Another court has stated that
by "the act of driving his car, [the driver] has waived his constitu-
tional privilege of self-incrimination." 34 Additionally, some courts
have dismissed the self-incrimination issue by reasoning that since
the driver may refuse to take a sobriety test, he is not compelled to
give evidence against himself.3
CONSENT
According to implied-consent statutes, one consents to a sobri-
ety test by operating an automobile. Although this consent can be
withdrawn by the refusal to take the test, such a decision results in
license revocation .3 Does this process involve waiver; and if so, what
class." Id. at 51, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 125. Thus, judicial approval of the implied-consent formula-
tion was grounded on a reasonable classification, the motorist's conditional privilege to drive
a car, the nontestimonial nature of chemical test results, the motorist's consent to a sobriety
test and waiver of any self-incrimination privilege. The Schutt court did not, however, discuss
the potentially coercive nature of the "consent-waiver" concept. See note 60 infra.
3' See, e.g., State v. Towry, 26 Conn. Supp. 35, 210 A.2d 455 (Super. Ct. 1965); Filmon
v. State, 336 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1976); State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958);
Blydenburg v. David, 413 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1967) (en banc); Jackson v. State, 25 Ohio Misc.
45, 266 N.E.2d 89 (1970); Department of Transp. v. Gallagher, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 371, 283
A.2d 508 (1971).
Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643, 649 (Me. 1969).
Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 420, 110 N.W.2d 75, 82 (1961).
Bailey v. City of Tulsa, 491 P.2d 316, 319 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
It appears that while the statutes and courts speak of consent that is implied from
holding a license or from the operation of an automobile, the consent necessary before a test
can be administered is express, upon the occasion of the officer's request. Therefore, if a driver
can refuse to take a sobriety test, then to what has lie impliedly consented by holding a license
or by driving on public roads? One court answered this question by holding that a driver has
consented to an intoxication test if he is rendered unconscious as a result of an automobile
collision, provided there is probable cause to believe he was driving while intoxicated. State
v. Wood, 576 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978). Even if the unconscious driver has
impliedly consented to a test, however, "he must be given the opportunity, when he regains
consciousness, to revoke his consent." Id.; see Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-7 (1973 & Supp. 1978);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1045 (Supp. 1978). Many statutes specifically provide that in the event
the driver is rendered unconscious, he is not deemed to have withdrawn his consent. See, e.g.,
CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(a) (West 1971 & Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.261(1)(c) (West
1975); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 95-1/2, § 11-501.1(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4511.19.1(B) (Page Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1202(a) (Supp. 1978).
Another answer may be that the driver has impliedly consented to a license forfeiture if he
should decline to submit to a sobriety test. Still another answer may be that the licensee-
driver has not impliedly consented to anything.
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criteria are to be employed in determining the effectiveness of such
a waiver?37
Consent imports the idea of agreement, approval or assent hav-
ing consequences and involving choice. Not every choice involves
waiver, but waiver exists when making a choice carries with it the
consequences of abandoning or foregoing certain benefits.3 8 In crimi-
nal procedure the act of consent most often means abandoning the
ability to claim potentially significant benefits.39 Simply stated, if
a driver submits to a sobriety test, he abandons his right to be free
from bodily intrusion. Thus, it is clear that such consent does, in
fact, entail the abandonment of a crucial benefit and therefore im-
plicates the concept of waiver.
The judicial definitions of waiver in criminal procedure are
based on the 1938 language of the United States Supreme Court in
It might be argued that since operating an automobile is a privilege, not a right, the
state can simply withdraw the privilege. This notion, however, overlooks the fundamental
concept that a state must grant or deny a privilege in a fair and reasonable manner that
comports with due process. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). An illustrative parallel
is the right to appellate review of criminal convictions in state courts. The Federal Constitu-
tion does not mandate that the states provide a system of appellate courts or that the states
grant a right to appellate review. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894). If a state,
however, elects to provide such a privilege, it must do so in a reasonable manner that does
not discriminate, since "at all stages of the proceeding the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses protect. . . from invidious discriminations." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956)
(citations omitted).
See generally C. BERRY, ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 30 (1973); 2 R. ERwIN, supra
note 2, § 32.05; Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55
TEX. L. REV. 193 (1977); Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1214 (1977).
3' "[O]nce the defendant has made a free and informed decision to forego his constitu-
tional defenses, he may constitutionally be held to the consequences of his election." Westen,
supra note 38, at 1254-55. Waiver can occur in a variety of situations. A suspect may consent
to a search and thereby waive his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Similarly, a suspect may
surrender his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), or at a post-indictment lineup, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967). A defendant charged with a felony may waive his fifth amendment right to a grand
jury indictment under "certain circumstances." Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 6 (1959)
(footnote omitted). Criminal defendants who proceed to trial may waive the right to a jury.
Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269 (1942). Additionally, "the privilege [to confront one's
accusers] may be lost by consent or at times even by misconduct." Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (citation omitted). A defendant may also waive his privilege to remain
silent at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Guajardo-Melendez, 401 F.2d 35, 38 n.5 (7th Cir.
1968); United States v. Pate, 357 F.2d 911, 915-16 (7th Cir. 1966). Once convicted "jai
defendant by committing a procedural default may be debarred from challenging his convic-
tion in the state courts even on federal constitutional grounds." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
428 (1963). This listing, while not all inclusive, indicates the potential for waiver in the
criminal process.
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Johnson v. Zerbst 0 that "waiver is ordinarily an intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."4' To be
effective as a waiver, it must be determined that the defendant has
competently and intelligently abandoned the right in question. 2
According to prior holdings of the Court, "competency" means vol-
untarily, 3 and voluntariness is to be judged by the "totality of the
relevant circumstances."44 The state "has the burden of proving
that the [waiver] was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This
burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence
to a claim of lawful authority. '4 5 Presuming waiver from a silent
record 6 or "presuming waiver of a fundamental right from inaction
is inconsistent" with the view that the "[c]ourts should 'indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver. '
In 1973 the Supreme Court, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,18
40 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
4' Id. at 464. The petitioners in Zerbst were convicted of possession of counterfeit money
and sought a writ of habeus corpus on the grounds that they had been denied the right to
counsel. Both petitioners were relatively uneducated, without acquaintances or funds, and
residents of states some distance from where they were indicted. After spending approxi-
mately 2 months in jail, unable to meet bail and having consulted with an attorney only at a
preliminary hearing, they were arraigned, tried, convicted and sentenced in a single day. Id.
at 460.
42 Id. at 465. The Court recognized the significance of a waiver of the right to counsel:
The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of
itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused-whose life or liberty is
at stake-is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty
responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent
and competent waiver by the accused. While an accused may waive the right to
counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial
court ....
Id.
, United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). The Zerbst Court also determined that
an intelligent waiver depends upon the "particular facts and circumstances surrounding that
case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." 304 U.S. at 464.
" Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 606 (1961). In discussing the criteria for deter-
mining the voluntariness of a confession, Justice Frankfurter stated:
The ultimate test [is] . . . the test of voluntariness. Is the [decision] the product
of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? . . . [Mf his will has
been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use
of his [decision] offends due process. . . . The line of distinction is that at which
governing self-direction is lost and compulsion, of whatever nature however infused,
propels or helps to propel the [decision].
Id. at 602 (citation omitted).
" Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
" Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
'7 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301
U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (footnote omitted)).
40 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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determined that there are in fact two distinct standards which are
utilized to judge the effectiveness of a waiver. Schneckloth involved
a conviction for possessing checks with intent to defraud in which
the critical evidence was obtained by a warrantless search of an
automobile stopped by the police for a traffic infraction. The officers
asked to search the car and the driver consented.49 The State con-
ceded that the only justification for the search was the consent of
the driver." Thus, the two issues presented to the Court were the
prosecution's burden with respect to the issue of voluntariness and
whether that burden had been carried.5
The Court in Schneckloth found that there "is a vast difference
between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. ' 52 "The protections of
the Fourth Amendment are of a wholly different order, and have
nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of
truth at a criminal trial. 53 Since "the Fourth Amendment protects
the 'security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the po-
lice' '. 4 the Court found that "[n]othing . . . in the purposes be-
hind requiring a 'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver of trial rights
. . . suggests that it ought to be extended to the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures."5 Thus, the
Court set forth the two standards by which the validity of a waiver
is to be judged: a "knowing and intelligent waiver" test for trial
rights56 and a "voluntary waiver" standard for other rights. The
,' Id. at 220.
Id. at 222.
" Id. at 223.
12 Id. at 241. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
412 U.S. at 242.
Id. (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)).
412 U.S. at 241.
The majority in Schneckloth conceded that "under the doctrine of Johnson v. Zerbst,
• . . to establish such a 'waiver' the State must demonstrate 'an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege."' Id. at 235 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). But the Court reasoned that the Zerbst Court "explicitly Ileft] open
the question whether a 'knowing and intelligent' waiver need be shown." 412 U.S. at 235
(footnote omitted). This is so, the Schneckloth Court stated, because the Zerbst "requirement
of a 'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver was articulated in a case involving the validity of a
defendant's decision to forego a right constitutionally guaranteed to protect a fair trial and
the reliability of the truth-determining process." Id. at 236. Certain rights-the right to
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latter is to be judged by the totality of all the surrounding circum-
stances. 57 Since consent to a sobriety test does not involve a waiver
of trial rights, it would appear that this standard is the proper one
by which to judge submission to the test.
Leaving aside the more exacting requirements of the knowing-
and-intelligent waiver standard,5 8 the less stringent voluntary-
waiver test requires a showing that the consent given was not the
result of duress or coercion, express or implied. The guide is whether
the consent is "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by its maker" and whether "his will has been overborne and
his capacity for self-determination critically impaired." 59 It is diffi-
cult to say that a driver's consent to a blood extraction is a free and
unconstrained choice when his refusal to consent results in the pen-
alty of license revocation. The potential license revocation consti-
tutes duress, albeit of an official nature. The entire process, even the
decision whether to operate a car or forego the privilege, involves
choice, but it is choice fraught with coercion." When an officer
counsel, confrontation, a jury trial, a speedy trial, the right to be free from being tried twice
for the same offense-guaranteed to a defendant "in order to preserve a fair trial," cannot
be waived without a demonstration of a knowing and intelligent waiver. Id. at 237-38 (foot-
note omitted). The knowing-and-intelligent waiver standard can be met when the record
shows that the person was mdrely advised by the officers of the right at issue. For example, a
waiver of the right to counsel during custodial interrogation may be effective if the officers
advise the accused of his Miranda rights and nevertheless he expressly elects to make a
statement. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
17 412 U.S. at 234 n.15. The Schneckloth Court stated:
[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify
a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not
the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of
fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge
of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not
required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a volun-
tary consent.
Id.'at 248-49 (footnote omitted).
" Under implied-consent statutes the consent occurs after an arrest. Thus, since "trial
rights" may be implicated, the knowing-and-intelligent waiver may be applicable. See Gen-
tile v. United States, 419 U.S. 979, 981 (1974) (Douglas and Marshall, JJ., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari); Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Consti-
tutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C.L. REv. 699 (1974).
"I Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973).
£0 Coercion and duress need not be of a physical or brutal nature to violate constitutional
guarantees. In Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), the Supreme Court reversed a
conviction based on statements made under the threat that silence would result in the loss
of the defendants' state employment. The Court reasoned:
[T]he forfeiture-of-office statute is relevant here only for the bearing it has on the
voluntary character of the statements . ...
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requests a driver to submit to a sobriety test there is no free choice;
it is merely an election between two evils: abandon the freedom
from search and seizure or abandon the privilege to drive. Moreover,
in those jurisdictions which admit evidence of a driver's refusal to
submit to a sobriety test in subsequent criminal proceedings, this
evidentiary rule appears to be an added penalty." This additional
factor further diminishes the free, voluntary consensual nature of
the motorist's election.
It appears the idea of "implying" consent, while of doubtful
validity under the knowing-and-intelligent waiver standard, may
not even satisfy the less stringent voluntary-waiver concept since
"consent to a search, in order to be voluntary, must be unequivocal,
specific and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion, and is not lightly to be inferred. '6 2
• ..The option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-
incrimination is the antithesis of free choice . . . . [It is] "likely to exert such
pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational
choice."
Where the choice is "between the rock and the whirpool," duress is inherent
in deciding to "waive" one or the other.
"It always is for the interest of a party under duress to choose the lesser of two
evils. But the fact that a choice was made according to interest does not exclude
duress."
Id. at 496-98 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464-65 (1966); Union Pac. R.R. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918)).
11 But see State v. Brean, 385 A.2d 1085 (1978). The defendant in Brean was convicted
of driving while under the influence of alcohol. At trial, evidence of his refusal to submit to a
sobriety test was admitted. In affirming the conviction, the court upheld the constitutionality
of the provision of the implied-consent statute which allows for the admission of such evi-
dence, stating that the law did not impose "a penalty on the exercise of [the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination . ..[since] he had no constitutional right, either state
or federal, to refuse to take the test." Id. at 1088 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966); State v. Pierce, 120 Vt. 373, 141 A.2d 419 (1958)).
" Rosenthall v. Henderson, 389 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir. 1968) (citing Simmons v. Bomar,
349 F.2d 365, 366 (6th Cir. 1965) (per curiam)).
There has been much discussion of the accused's capacity to commit a crime, that is,
whether he had the requisite mens rea, to be held liable for his acts or omission. See generally
R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 739 (1969). A different concern includes the accused's capacity to
stand trial. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.04. The Supreme Court in Dusky stated that the defendant must have "sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and
a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." 362 U.S. at
402.
The narrower focus, capacity to waive a legal right, involves the same concept and
guidewords. Definitional language for this concept is found in Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312
(1966) (per curiam), where the Supreme Court addressed the problem of capacity to waive
the right to appellate review of a murder conviction. When Rees sought to withdraw his
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CAPACITY TO CONSENT
The definition of consent presupposes a defendant's capacity to
choose between the courses of action presented. "Capacity" empha-
sizes the individual's ability to do what is necessary to voluntarily
consent." By its nature, "capacity" is a somewhat subjective term.
That is perhaps why judicial discussion of capacity has at times
been vague. In grappling with this issue, courts have established
that the person's present ability to appreciate his position and make
a rational choice, made possible by a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceeding, will determine whether he is capa-
ble of consenting.64 Thus, capacity involves not only awareness of
choice, but the ability to analyze factual, legal or tactical considera-
tions in light of influences which may or may not be proper, 5 and
make a decision to act accordingly.
petition for certiorari, evidence was produced suggesting Rees was psychologically unsound.
The Court remanded for a determination of his
mental competence in the present posture of things, that is, whether he has capac-
ity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing
or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from
a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in
the premises.
Id. at 314. The words "capacity to appreciate his position and make a rationale choice," as
qualified by Dusky's requirement of "a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceeding," provide a guide by which to evaluate the defendant's capacity to make the
choice to effectuate a legal waiver.
91 See note 63 supra. Courts have not been helpful in specifically defining some of the
key words in this judicial standard. Unfortunately, the courts have been more inclined to
engage in conclusionary discussions, describing the facts and coming to a conclusion without
analysis. This trend seems to be the result of the Supreme Court's holding in Schneckloth
that the voluntariness of consent is "to be determined from a totality of all the circumstan-
ces." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); see notes 48-59 and accompanying
text supra. As noted by Professor Weinreb, "[t]he product of [Schneckloth] is likely to be
still another series of fourth amendment cases in which the courts provide a lengthy factual
description followed by a conclusion (most likely, in the current climate, that consent was
voluntarily given), without anything to connect the two." Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth
Amendment, 42 U. CH. L. REV. 47, 57 (1974).
15 H.L.A. Hart, in his discussion of responsibility for criminal acts, has stated:
In most contexts, as I have already stressed, the expression he is responsible
for his actions is used to assert that a person has certain normal capacities. These
constitute the most important criteria of moral liability-responsibility, though it is
characteristic of most legal systems that they have given only a partial or tardy
recognition to all these capacities as general criteria of legal responsibility. The
capacities in question are those of understanding, reasoning, and control of con-
duct: the ability to understand what conduct legal rules or morality requires, to
deliberate and reach decisions concerning these requirements, and to conform to
decisions when made.
H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILrrY 227 (1957).
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Knowledge of the statute's requirement would appear to be
necessary before one could consent. Yet it might be said that the act
of driving indicated such knowledge, either presumptively or irre-
futably. The fundamental concept that all are presumed to know
the law, and the criminal law adaptation that ignorance of the law
is no excuse, might suggest actual knowledge of the implied-consent
statute is necessary.6 If this be the case, an inquiry into a driver's
knowledge of the statutory requirement would seem to be irrelevant.
Even if actual knowledge of the statutory requirement is irrele-
vant, there are other considerations of knowledge relevant "to the
consequences of taking a sobriety test. Need the driver know that
test results showing intoxication would virtually conclude guilt in
any criminal trial? A person's decision may be influenced by knowl-
edge of the magnitude of the offense and the potential penalty upon
conviction. Additionally, is it necessary that the driver know the
consequences of refusing to be tested? Some statutes provide that
the suspect need not be advised that test refusal will result in license
revocation.67 Even if so advised, knowledge of the attendant conse-
quences of revocation may not be considered. But such detailed
considerations, while clearly relevant to the question of knowledge,
have not been the subject of judicial inquiry.8 It appears that the
legislatures and the courts are satisfied with either presumed knowl-
edge or, if the statute requires, the knowledge acquired from the
information supplied by the arresting officer.
If the law is so quickly satisfied with this analysis of the first
aspect of capacity, what of the second factor, the ability to deliber-
ate, choose and act in a rational manner? If the exercise of a driver's
options-not to drive, to take or refuse to take a sobriety test-is a
rational choice, and the consequent action signifies the ability to
choose in a rational manner, the inquiry is short lived and the parti-
cularized circumstances in each case are irrelevant. A choice is al-
ways made-the law compels a choice. Even the failure to respond
See State v. King, 257 N.W.2d 693 (Minn. 1977); State v. Collova, 79 Wis. 2d 473, 255
N.W.2d 581 (1977). See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955); Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 35 (1939). The
notion that every individual is presumed to know the law and the corollary, that ignorance
of the law is no defense, are premised on considerations of societal stability. See Perkins,
supra, at 40 (1939).
' See note 11 supra.
' Professor Weinreb has observed that what is needed is a "firm principle for deciding
in varying circumstances whether ignorance of a highly relevant fact deprives consent of




when asked to submit to an intoxication test is considered a refusal
and, therefore, a choice. "9 This superficial approach is not a wholly
improbable position for a court to take. In fact, a driver's claim that
he did not have the capacity to rationally decide whether to take
the sobriety test owing to lack of intelligence"0 or belief of inno-
cence 7' have been held not to impair the effectiveness of the choice.
One reason for this approach is the difficulty in determining a per-
son's state of mind. In considering an accused's state of mind at the
time of his act, it is relatively simple to show that he lacked voli-
tional muscular control. It is much more difficult to establish
whether a person had the ability to deliberate, choose and conse-
quently act in a rational manner.72
11 Lampman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 28 Cal. App. 3d 922, 105 Cal. Rptr. 101
(1972). In Lampman, the plaintiff, who was arrested for driving while intoxicated, was in-
formed of her right to remain silent, her right to an attorney and was told of her obligation
to either submit to one of three chemical sobriety tests or forfeit her license for 6 months. Id.
at 925, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 102. Although repeatedly informed of her obligation to submit to a
sobriety test, she failed to respond to each request to take the test. Id. Following the suspen-
sion of her license, the plaintiff sued to have the suspension set aside on the ground that her
failure to respond did not constitute a refusal, but rather, was the result of confusion created
by the arresting officer's initial statement that she had a right to remain silent. Id. at 925-
27, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03; cf. Rust v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 267 Cal. App. 2d 545,
73 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1968) (where defendant is confused regarding his right to have an attorney
present, the arresting officer should make it clear that a right to counsel is inapplicable where
administration of a sobriety test is at issue). The Lampman court rejected the plaintiff's
contention, stating that once the plaintiff had been informed that she did not have the right
to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to a test, it should have been
clear to her that she was obliged to respond either affirmatively or negatively to the officer's
request. 28 Cal. App. 3d at 926, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 103. Moreover, since the plaintiff had spoken
to the arresting officer about other matters following her arrest, the court did not find the
"fair meaning" of the plaintiff's failure to respond, indicative of confusion. Id. at 927, 105
Cal. Rptr. at 103.
70 Goodman v. Orr, 19 Cal. App. 3d 845, 857, 97 Cal. Rptr. 226, 234 (1971); see State v.
Hurbean, 23 Ohio App. 2d 119, 261 N.E.2d 290 (1970). In Hurbean, the court stated:
An understanding of the advice respecting the consequences of a refusal to take
the chemical test is not an element of the mental process of refusal to take the'test.
If there was no subjective awareness on the part of the licensee that she was
being asked to take the test, then . . . it could not be true that she refused to take
it. However, refusal to take a test when requested is a separate factual matter from
an understanding of the consequences of the refusal.
Id. at 126, 261 N.E.2d at 297-99.
"1 See McGarry v. Costello, 128 Vt. 234, 260 A.2d 402 (1969). In McGarry, the court held
that where an arresting officer has a reasonable basis to believe that the driver of a vehicle is
under the influence of alcohol, the driver cannot refuse to submit to a sobriety test on the
ground that he is "innocent of the offense charged. . . . [Innocence, even if vindicated by
acquittal, affords no legal justification for refusing the test." Id. at 239, 260 A.2d at 405.
11 The problems inherent in proving whether an individual was capable of making a
rational decision have been observed by H.L.A. Hart:
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Aside from general emotional, psychological or intelligence fac-
tors that bear on a defendant's ability to deliberate and act accord-
ingly, there is the effect of intoxication on the driver's capacity to
make rational decisions. Intoxication is a constant factor in the
driver's determination whether to take a sobriety test. The funda-
mental rule, however, that voluntary intoxication is no excuse for
criminal acts has helped to resolve the issue of the legal effect of
intoxication on the motorist's capacity to consent.73 Generally, it
has been held that intoxication does not render the driver incapable
of submitting to an intoxication test 74 as long as the driver is given
the opportunity to make a choice. 75 Thus, in Washington, where the
implied-consent statute requires the arresting officer to advise the
motorist of the consequences of a refusal to take a sobriety test, the
highest court of the state has reasoned that the requirement pro-
vides the arrested driver "the opportunity of exercising an intelli-
Further difficulties of proof may cause a legal system to limit its inquiry into the
agent's "subjective condition" by asking what a "reasonable man" could in the
circumstances have known or foreseen, or by asking whether a "reasonable man"
in the circumstances would have been deprived (say, by provocation) of self-
control; and the system may then impute to the agent such knowledge or foresight
or control.
H. HART, supra note 65, at 103.
73 See, e.g., State v. Rabago, 24 Or. App. 95, 544 P.2d 1061 (1976); MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.08 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Under the Model Penal Code:
1) [Voluntary] intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an
element of the offense.
2) When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to
self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware
had he been sober, such awareness is immaterial.
Id.
7 See, e.g., Bush v. Bright, 264 Cal. App. 2d 788, 71 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1968); Landin v.
Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety, 475 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971); Hering v. Department of
Motor Vehicles, 13 Wash. App. 190, 534 P.2d 143 (1975). In Bush v. Bright the court held
that "regardless of the degree of his voluntary intoxication or lack of understanding resulting
therefrom, when a driver of an automobile refuses or otherwise manifests an unwillingness to
take the required test he is subject to the license suspension provisions ...." 264 Cal. App.
2d at 791, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 126. The court reasoned that to permit an extremely intoxicated
driver to avoid accountability on the ground that he was too inebriated to exercise intelligent
judgment "would lead to absurd consequences" and would "frustrate the purpose of the
Legislature." Id. at -, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
7' Hering v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 13 Wash. App. 190, 534 P.2d 143, 146 (1975).
In rejecting plaintiff's contention that extreme inebriation rendered him incapable of making
a rational decision concerning whether to submit to a chemical sobriety test, the Hering court
ruled that statutory provisions requiring a knowing and intelligent refusal to submit to a
sobriety test are met when an individual "is given the opportunity to exercise an intelligent
judgment." The individual's "inability to do so because of intoxication" is, therefore, "of no
consequence." Id. at 192-93, 534 P.2d at 146.
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gent judgment if he is capable of doing so."' 78 The court added that
nothing in the statute indicates that "an operator . . . too intoxi-
cated to understand the advice given him and to respond intelli-
gently . . . [should] be excused from the penalty . . . for refusal
to comply with the request that he submit to a test. '77 A driver's
inability to exercise intelligent judgment is not, according to this
view, a deterrent to an effective choice and a valid waiver.78 Simi-
larly, the Ohio courts are satisfied if the officer advises the arrestee
of the consequences of a refusal to submit to a sobriety test. As the
Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "It is possible for a licensee to be in
such a state of intoxication that he does not understand what is
happening, and, at the same time, by words, acts and general con-
duct to manifest an unwillingness or outright refusal to take the
test."79
To conclude, it is obvious that intoxication impairs a person's
mental ability, hence the prohibition against driving while intoxi-
cated. To dismiss the impact of intoxication on capacity is to ignore,
in many cases, an obviously diminished capacity, thereby calling
into question the validity of the process. It has been suggested that,
78 Department of Motor Vehicles v. McElwain, 80 Wash. 2d 624, 628, 496 P.2d 963, 965
(1972) (en banc). The Washington statute provides in part:
[The arresting] officer shall inform the [driver] of his right to refuse the test
.... The officer shall warn the driver that his privilege to drive will be revoked
or denied if he refuses to submit to the test.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.308(1) (West 1970).
" Department of Motor Vehicles v. McElwain, 80 Wash. 2d 625, 628, 496 P.2d 963, 965
(1972).
78 The McElwain court explained its position concerning the effect of intoxication on the
capacity of an arrested driver to refuse to submit to a sobriety test as follows:
[W]e fail to find anywhere in the statute an expressed intent that an operator who,
while not unconscious, is yet too intoxicated to understand the advice given him
and to respond intelligently to it, shall be excused from the penalty provided
therein for refusal to comply with the request that he submit to a test.
Id. at 628, 496 P.2d at 965. If such an exemption were granted, the court reasoned, the
statute's purpose would be emasculated. Id.
1' Hoban v. Rice, 25 Ohio St. 2d 111, 117, 267 N.E.2d 311, 315 (1971). Under the Ohio
implied consent statute:
If a person under arrest for the offense of driving a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol refuses upon the request of a police officer to submit to a
chemical test . . . . after first having been advised of the consequences of his
refusal . . . . no chemical test shall be given, but the registrar of motor vehicles
. . . shall suspend his license . . . for a period of six months. . ..
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1(D) (Page 1973). This "opportunity in name only," however,
may be limited. For example, the California courts have held that a driver's refusal to submit
to a sobriety test results in license suspension "regardless of the degree of his voluntary
intoxication. . . ." Bush v. Bright, 264 Cal. App. 2d 788, 791, 71 Cal. Rptr. 123, 126 (1968)
(emphasis added).
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in recognition of the effect of intoxication, the trier of fact in a
criminal trial should consider a "less than free will" mitigation or
excuse."' Surely intoxication and its effect on the driver's capacity
to make a legally significant choice is relevant. Recognition of this
would afford greater fairness to the accused and enhance citizen
"perception of fairness of the law."81
PERSPECTIVE
Several observations appear justified. Assuming Schmerber to
be correct, it is conceded that the state could compel a chemical test
without the consent and over the express objections of an arrested
motorist. States have not followed this route. Rather, implied-
consent statutes have been enacted which require the driver's ex-
press consent in order to be tested for intoxication.
Under this statutory scheme, consent suffers from logical defi-
ciencies. The notion that consent-a free, conscious, contempora-
neous choice-is to be implied from common and often necessary
conduct, such as driving, is troublsome. Motorists are not a distinct
homogeneous group who have entered into a particular vocation
from which it may be plausibly inferred that various secondary
consequences were considered and accepted. Entering into certain
professions may be said to involve consent to consequences arising
from that profession. For example, a professional football player can
be said to know and accept a certain degree of physical contact
which would otherwise constitute actionable assault and battery. 2
In contrast, licensed firearms dealers and liquor dealers are engaged
in vocations long subject to close governmental regulation, yet the
Supreme Court has held that the dealers have not consented to
inspections and searches merely by virtue of their profession.,, Simi-
larly, airplane passengers are not deemed to impliedly consent to
boarding searches for hidden weapons. Courts have rejected the idea
that the government has conditioned a passenger's exercise of his
rights to travel on voluntary relinquishment of fourth amendment
rights by stating: "[Implied consent under such circumstances
would be inherently coercive." s
Wald, Alcohol, Drugs, and Criminal Responsibility, 63 GEO. L.J. 69, 69-74, 86 (1974).
" See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTIC 3-4 (1971).
See Note, Consent in Criminal Law: Violence in Sports, 75 MIC. L. REv. 148 (1976).
United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311,315 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
8" United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1093 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); accord, Pekar v.
United States, 315 F.2d 319, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1963); Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217,
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Aside from the coercive nature of such circumstances, implying
consent from conduct requires an evaluation of an individual's ac-
tual intent through the application of the average man standard
which tends to ignore the individual and reality.8 5 This "is to treat
men as things, not as persons, as means and not as ends." 8 An effort
should always be made to ascertain actual knowledge and capacity
of the accused if law is to embody the idea of fairness to individuals
without the unnecessary "sacrifice of the individual."" Thus, to
speak in terms of implying consent from the act of driving would
seem unwarranted, logically difficult and potentially dangerous.
If implied-consent statutes are not premised on consent implied
from driving, then it may be more accurate to view such statutes
as granting a privilege subject to the condition that the driver sub-
mit to a sobriety test upon a police officer's demand. The subse-
quent decision whether to submit to a sobriety test can be described
as a compulsory election. If the driver refuses to submit, the result-
ing license forfeiture can be evaluated in terms of the reasonableness
of the condition and the fairness of the revocation process.88 On the
other hand, if the driver submits to an intoxication test, with the
results indicating intoxication, it is submitted that there is a sub-
219-21 (9th Cir. 1960); McGinley & Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable
Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 293 (1972). In Lopez, the defendant was designated a potential
hijacker by airline boarding personnel and was searched for weapons by United States mar-
shals acting without a warrant. 328 F. Supp. at 1081-82. Although the search of Lopez was
found to be unjustified because airline employees departed from neutral and objective crite-
ria for identifying potential hijackers, the district court stated that a properly supervised,
neutral and objective hijacking prevention system would be constitutional. Id. at 1102. The
Lopez court stated that although justifiable as a protective frisk, such a search could not be
predicated on the theory that the passenger impliedly consented to a voluntary relinquish-
ment of his fourth amendment rights: "Consent to search involves a relinquishment of fund-
amental constitutional rights and should not be lightly inferred." Id. at 1092 (citations
omitted). To sustain a search based on consent, it must be shown that consent was "'un-
equivocal, specific, and intelligently given.'" Id. at 1093 (quoting United States v. Smith,
308 F.2d 657, 663 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906 (1963)).
" As the Court has observed in another context, mere "acquiescence to a claim of lawful
authority" cannot be given the effect of conserit. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,
548-49 (1968) (footnote omitted). In Bumper, the Court held that where an individual con-
sents to a search of his premises, in reliance upon an official's assertion that a valid warrant
was issued, such reliance cannot be deemed consent if the warrant was in fact invalid at the
time of the search or if the official did not possess a warrant. Id. at 548-50.
" H. HAirr, supra note 65, at 242.
' Id. at 243.
See, e.g, Serenko v. Bright, 263 Cal. App. 2d 682, 70 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968); Mauldin v.
State, 239 Md. 592, 212 A.2d 502 (1965); Beare v. Smith, 82 S.D. 20, 140 N.W.2d 603 (1966).
The reasonableness of the condition may be evaluated by weighing the competing considera-
tions of public safety and the deprivation suffered by the motorist whose license has been
suspended. Also to be considered is the fairness of the revocation procedure.
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stantial question as to the validity of admitting the test results in a
subsequent criminal action. At this point actual consent, not im-
plied consent, is at issue. It could be argued that since the decision
to submit to a test is made after a custodial arrest, a court should
employ the Zerbst knowing-and-intelligent waiver criterion, prior to
admitting into evidence sobriety test results. 9 Even using the less
stringent voluntary-consent test of Schneckloth, an evaluation of
the totality of the circumstances incorporates factors which mitigate
against a finding of voluntary consent. Such factors include: com-
pulsory choice between two undesirable alternatives, custodial ar-
rest, physical restraint, absence of counsel, doubtful appreciation of
the significance of the choice, ignorance of legal consequences and
possible diminished capacity owing to intoxication. Additionally,
there may be an equality problem since some motorists, such as the
neophyte to such encounters with police officers, might submit to a
potentially incriminating sobriety test, while a more informed mo-
torist might refuse to take the test and incur a civil sanction.
The presence of the above factors makes it doubtful that there
can be a showing that the driver's decision to submit to a sobriety
test was truly a free and unconstrained choice to abandon signifi-
cant legal rights. The problem of coercion necessitates a viable judi-
cial definition of voluntariness for purposes of determining a valid
waiver. It is submitted that the result of an intoxication test and any
testimony concerning it should be subject to exclusion from any trial
or proceeding if the judge, applying the voluntary standard enunci-
ated in Zerbst, determines that the defendant's decision to submit
to a chemical test is not the result of free will. This process would
appear to require a non-jury hearing analogous to those mandated
on the issue of the voluntariness of a criminal defendant's confes-
sion.'
" See notes 8, 62-64 and accompanying text supra.
" See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
1' Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 394 (1964); People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204
N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965); Title II, Crime Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)
(1976). In Jackson, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder. Upon a petition for
habeas corpus, the defendant challenged both the admission of his confession at trial and the
procedure utilized by New York courts for determining the voluntary character of confessions.
The Supreme Court held that "the issue of [the defendant's] confession should not have
been decided by the convicting jury but should have been determined in a proceeding sepa-
rate and apart from the body trying guilt or innocence." 378 U.S. at 394. The Court explained
the policy considerations underlying its holding as follows:
Expanded concepts of fairness in obtaining confessions have been accompanied by
a correspondingly greater complexity in determining whether an accused's will has
been overborne-facts are frequently disputed, questions of credibility are often
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These observations warrant the conclusion that the implied-
consent nomenclature, as well as the premise that consent may be
implied from conduct, should be abandoned. It seems logically and
definitionally doubtful that implied-consent statutes are premised
on voluntary consent in view of the sanction for refusing to consent
and the motorist's questionable capacity to voluntarily consent.
This observation, even if deemed essentially accurate, would not be
viewed by many as a determinative factor. Rather, for some there
is the broader concern of balancing society's interest against an
individual's interest. A pragmatic view of this confrontation might
quickly lead to the conclusion that society's interests are paramount
and the individual's interests must give way. Similarly, a utilitarian
assessment would necessitate balancing the interests of the major-
ity-the motorists and pedestrians who could be potential victims
of a drunk driver-against the inconvenience and minor sacrifice to
those required to either submit to a sobriety test or forfeit their
driving privilege.2 Such an examination would result in a finding
for the greater good of the majority.
This conclusion, while readily understandable and apparently
justified, should not be accepted without some appraisal of the in-
terests sacrificed in the name of the common good. There is more
at stake than the desire of a drunk driver to escape punishment. At
issue is whether the government will deal with its citizens fairly and
honestly or merely efficiently. Implied-consent statutes are useful as
a partial answer to a substantial societal problem and, admittedly,
the individual under this scheme is not subjected to wholly unwar-
ranted sanctions; but that should not finalize the inquiry. John
Rawls stated: "Each person possesses inviolability founded on jus-
tice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot overide ...
Therefore in a just society . . . the rights secured by justice are not
subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of societal inter-
ests." 3 Even assuming a "justice-as-fairness" posture, as Rawls
argues, one might question whether the individual interest involved
in implied-consent statutes is "secured by justice" and rises to the
crucial, and inferences to be drawn from established facts are often determinative.
The overall determination of the voluntariness of a confession has thus become an
exceedingly sensitive task, one that requires facing the issue squarely, in illuminat-
ing isolation and unbeclouded by other issues and the effect of extraneous but
prejudicial evidence.
Id. at 390.
92 See T. BENDrrr, LAW As RULE AND PRINCIPLE 18-19 (1978) (citing R. POUND, SOCIAL
CONTROL THROUGH LAW 109-10 (1942)).
11 J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JusTc. 3-4 (1971).
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level of Rawlsian inviolability. It may be argued that an individual's
privacy interest and an individual's interest in free and voluntary
choices constitute substantial societal interests which certainly re-
flect on the character of justice. Thus, the manner in which the
government deals with its individual citizens has a substantial im-
pact on the meaning and image of justice.
To say that implied-consent statutes are not based upon consti-
tutional notions of voluntary consent is not to say that these stat-
utes are unconstitutional. Rather, it is to suggest that the statutes
are erroneously labeled and expound a faulty concept. If the state
can with impunity label coercion "consent," surely the idea suffers
as a normative guide in other contexts as well. This false labeling
is not only an affront to the concept of consent, but also damages
the integrity of the law as a mechanism for justice. Legal fictions
are not uncommon in the law, but they are generally spawned of
necessity. In the instant case there is neither necessity nor justifica-
tion. There is no imperative to clothe this statutory mechanism in
the legal fiction of consent. Implied-consent statutes may be desira-
ble, even necessary, but the label and express premise-implied
consent-is optional.
It is argued that if the defendant has consented, he will not be
heard to complain of the results. This premature termination of the
consideration of consent tends to foreclose consideration of other
potential problems, such as the reasonableness of the condition, the
fairness of the process or the value of what has been forfeited by the
individual and society. A straightforward approach, absent the
implied-consent contrivance, would encourage a more meaningful
analysis. The unnecessary fiction of consent consistently frustrates
inquiry, thus inviting overreaching. If this be the case then the
sophistic device of implied consent should be abandoned in the
interest of legal accuracy and integrity. The law should be freed of
patently fictitious contrivances which call into question the veracity
of the legal enterprise. Otherwise, the tolerance of substantial dis-
tortions on the lexicon of law will breed similar distortions to the
point of fatal stress on a system of government dependent upon
citizen faith and acquiescence to rules of law.
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